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Abstract
Accounting and auditing are often cited as key sites where business regulation has been privatized, globalized 
and neoliberalized. Yet, these sites have also undergone a legitimacy crisis in recent years, marked by a shift 
from self-regulation to increased public oversight. This paper investigates these developments by reference 
to the evolution of a public/private audit oversight regime (audit of the auditors) in Russia. We show 
how, in the early stages of post-Soviet reforms, old state-administered forms of financial oversight were 
replaced with market-oriented arrangements (peer reviews) offered by newly founded private professional 
accountancy associations as a service to their members. Fifteen years later, the process of regulatory 
privatization culminated in a reinvigoration of public authority. Our longitudinal analysis highlights the pivotal 
role of the state in the liberalization of governance by showing how audit oversight privatization was not 
only enabled by, but also provided a condition for, the strengthening of government actors. We introduce 
the term ‘legislative layering’ to denote the mechanism that enabled public actors to redeploy themselves in 
the face of the rising market logic to ensure continuity in their regulatory objectives.
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Introduction
Over the past few decades, the relevance of private sector organizations in the governance of busi-
ness conduct has vastly expanded (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Prior 
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literature has been useful in depicting the significance and complexity of various public-private 
governance arrays. Particularly, attention has been devoted to cross-national and cross-sectoral 
variation in the composition of what is widely referred to as the ‘governance triangle’ consisting of 
state, market, civil society and other non-governmental private organizations, including standard-
setting and professional organizations (Abbott & Snidal, 2001; but see also Büthe & Mattli, 2011; 
Eberlein, Abbott, Black, Meidinger, & Wood, 2014). However, we do not know much about 
dynamics of change within such regimes: how and why the relative influence and positioning of 
public and private actors within a specific ‘governance triangle’ may shift over time and with what 
consequences. Moreover, the literature has not adequately engaged with issues concerning the 
evolving role of the state in ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2005), often 
portraying public actors as rule-takers rather than rule-makers, particularly in the context of inter-
national business regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Büthe & Mattli, 2011).
Meanwhile, governments have continued to be involved in public-private governance arrange-
ments. In some cases, they have stepped back in to reassert their authority, as for example in 
accounting and audit regulation. Triggered by the demise of Arthur Andersen, the Enron scandal 
and the 2008 financial crisis, accounting and auditing underwent a profound legitimacy crisis that 
led to a shift from predominantly privately organized self-regulation to increased public oversight 
(Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; 
Malsch & Gendron, 2011). Studies have examined the renewed relevance of government actors 
in audit regulation. Yet, apart from some exceptions, accounts of rising public oversight have 
primarily been interested in the state in terms of its role in formally endorsing and facilitating 
(Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Malsch & Gendron, 2011) or hampering (Caramanis et al., 
2015) such regimes. These studies do not explore how changes in the organization of audit over-
sight may have consequences for the evolution and organization of government itself. We aim to 
provide better understanding of how government actors maintain and enhance their relevance and 
authority in public-private regulatory regimes. In so doing, we directly respond to recent calls for 
further research into the expansion of the state, both ‘in terms of its scope (the range of functions 
it performs), … [and] its capacity to perform the core functions it has long engaged in’ (Soifer, 
2016, p. 188).
This paper focuses on the evolving regime of audit oversight (audits of the auditors) in Russia 
where the introduction of additional state-organized inspections of audit has challenged the rele-
vance of private regulation, such as peer reviews administered by private professional associa-
tions. In auditing, peer reviews refer to a process by which a qualified audit firm reviews the 
operational procedures of another audit firm to ensure that they meet certain standards. Audit in 
Russia presents an apt setting for studying change dynamics in public-private regulation because 
of the nature of institutional transformations it underwent and the varying involvement of govern-
ment actors in these. Our analysis of the changes in audit oversight organization offers the follow-
ing contributions.
First, we take a longitudinal approach to show how and why regulatory privatization, far from 
being a retreat of public governance, may, in effect, be a prelude to the strengthening of govern-
ment. Both the privatization of audit regulation and the subsequent rise of public audit oversight 
were made possible by government interventions. We show how government actors reinvent and 
expand their roles in an evolving public-private regulatory regime. Drawing on historical institu-
tionalism and theories of gradual institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2009), we develop the notion of ‘legislative layering’ to draw attention to a 
particular mechanism of state expansion where government actors draw on law as an organiza-
tional resource (Pedriana & Stryker, 2004) to mould their relations with private governance.
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Second, we expose the futility of drawing a strict demarcation line between public and private 
governance forms and actors as they negoiate the organization of dispersed governance domains 
(Arellano-Gault, Demortain, Rouillard, & Thoenig, 2013; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012). We point to 
the co-produced nature of the relationship between them and the need to see their regulatory 
authority as mutually contingent – i.e. as both moderating and extending each other’s organizing 
influence and capacity to act. We demonstrate that in public-private governance regimes the ability 
of government actors to maintain and expand their core functions is dependent on their legislative 
remit, as much as on their ability to co-ordinate and leverage capacities of private governance to 
convert law into desirable regulatory outcomes.
Regulatory Privatization and Its Limits
With rising globalization, we have seen a proliferation of new technologies for the regulation of 
business conduct, accompanied by greater reliance on private regulation and self-regulation, and 
the rise of independent regulatory agencies acting at arms’ length from governments (Braithwaite 
& Drahos, 2000; Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Djelic & Sahlin, 2012). Also, in accounting and auditing, 
rule-making has been transferred from governments to globally operating private standard-setting 
bodies. Political science and regulation scholars have queried the power, accountability and legiti-
macy of these organizations.
Much has been written about the politics of international accounting and audit standard-setting 
and its proneness to regulatory capture (Botzem, 2012; Loft, Humphrey, & Turley, 2006; Morley, 
2016; Tamm Hallström, 2004), the political and distributional implications of global private 
accounting and audit rule-making (Arnold, 2012; Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Perry & Nölke, 2006), and 
the capacity of international standard-setters to push through new practice concepts, sometimes 
against the will of their constituents (Erb & Pelger, 2015). Scholars, such as Botzem and Dobusch 
(2012), have examined the formation and diffusion of accounting standards as recursive cycles of 
input and output legitimacy, usefully articulating a process perspective on private standard-setting. 
But none of the studies cited above have devoted much attention to the changing roles of govern-
ment in these processes – such roles are either eclipsed (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Erb & Pelger, 2015) 
or touched upon merely implicitly (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012).
Studies of ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Braithwaite, 2008; Levi-Faur, 2005) can offer a useful start-
ing point to redress this shortcoming. They draw attention to processes of regulatory privatization 
– shifts from ‘government’ (hard law, command and control) to ‘governance’ (soft law, contracting, 
self-regulation, public-private regulatory arrangements), the delegation of responsibility from 
‘political’ (governmental) to ‘professional’ organizations, regulatory agencies or expert networks 
(Jordana, Levi-Faur, & Fernández i Marín, 2011; Levi-Faur, 2011) – highlighting that such devel-
opments have not led to a dismantling of the state.
A focus on ‘regulatory capitalism’ helps situate regulatory privatization in broader processes of 
societal transformation and organizational change where state, markets and society are not treated 
as distinct entities or their relationships as zero-sum game (Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 14; Braithwaite, 
2008). Any change in governmental configuration is expected to be reflected in the economy and 
society, and vice versa. As Levi-Faur put it, states and markets are seen as forming part of an inte-
grated ensemble of governance: ‘The regulatory and policy-making institutions of the state are one 
element of the market, one set of institutions, through which the overall process of governance 
operates’ (Underhill, 2003, p. 254; quoted in Levi-Faur, 2005, p. 28). States and markets, public 
and private regulation, act as flexible surrounds for each other, mutually conditioning and shaping 
each other (Abbott, 2005). Yet, despite this focus on state and market co-evolution, most empirical 
studies of regulatory capitalism tend to concentrate on the rise and effects of new types of 
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regulatory organization in a given sector (Jordana et al., 2011; Levi-Faur, 2006), giving limited 
attention to how these are implicated in changing relations between state, market and society over 
time.
Outside the regulatory capitalism paradigm, studies of transnational governance in international 
relations and law have placed more explicit emphasis on interactions between state and non-state 
regulation. Abbott and Snidal (2009) depict the diversity of regulatory standard-setting in a ‘gov-
ernance triangle’ whose main players are made up by state actors (national and international gov-
ernmental organizations), firms and nongovernmental (private) organizations. The triangle is 
mobilized for representing situations in which different (combinations of) actor categories domi-
nate the governance of a particular domain (Abbott & Snidal, 2009, p. 513; Eberlein et al., 2014). 
Yet, it is static in orientation and therefore of limited use in understanding change in the composi-
tion and relative influence of public and private actors.
Our study seeks to redress this shortcoming by combining regulatory capitalism and historical 
institutionalist perspectives (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009) to get to grips with long-term processes of 
institutional change in public-private regulation of post-Soviet audit oversight. Responding to recent 
calls for better understanding of the expansion of the state in public-private regulation regimes 
(Soifer, 2016), we are particularly interested in the implications of such processes for the regulatory 
roles played by government actors. The case of Russia is interesting as we are dealing with a state 
in transition, where regulatory privatization has been unfolding against the background of trans-
forming governmental authority and shifting relationships between state and non-state actors.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the roles of government had been called into question 
and, as a consequence, spheres of state action and non-action had to be reworked. Privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, and also of regulation itself, was envisaged by government actors (e.g. the 
Finance Ministry) as a means to create a new regulatory space through which Russia’s government 
and economy could be reorganized according to Western constructs of a globally integrated market 
economy (Djelic, 2006; Mennicken, 2010). New political and economic institutions had to be 
established, including private sector audit and audit regulation, as well as distinctions between 
public and private realms of business and regulatory activity.
The first private audit firms were founded in Russia in the late 1980s; additionally, the big inter-
national audit firms began to open branch offices at that time (Cooper, Greenwood, Hinings, & 
Brown, 1998). Before 1998, the Big Six global audit firms included Coopers & Lybrand, Price 
Waterhouse, KPMG, Deloitte, Arthur Andersen, and Ernst & Young. They later became the Big Four 
following the establishment of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and the demise of Arthur Andersen.
Until 1993, private sector auditing was largely unregulated. Auditors, for example, were not 
required to have a professional qualification to carry out audits, nor were audit firms subject to any 
licensing or external quality control. This institutional ‘void’ was the product of, and legitimized 
by, early post-Soviet privatization, marketization and liberalization. Yet, in the years that followed 
we observe a shift towards public re-regulation where regulatory privatization, the control of audit 
by private professional audit associations, came to be orchestrated and superintended by govern-
ment actors.
Such shifts in audit oversight re-regulation are not unique to Russia. After Enron, WorldCom, 
and the demise of Arthur Andersen, we see a rise in public audit oversight schemes in many coun-
tries, replacing or complementing self-regulatory arrangements, such as peer reviews, with govern-
ment-led (or endorsed) audit inspections. Prior studies have examined local manifestations of this 
global regulatory trend, drawing attention to the workings of emerging independent oversight bod-
ies, many of which were modelled on the United States’ Public Company Accounts Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) founded in 2002 (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013, 2016; Caramanis et al., 2015; 
Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). These studies have stressed the contextually 
contingent nature of local enactment of global regulatory trends, highlighting the proneness of 
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such regimes to regulatory capture by international audit firms and local professional associations 
(see Caramanis et al., 2015, for the case of Greece, and accounts of local resistance by Malsch & 
Gendron, 2011; Hazgui & Gendron, 2015; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016). These accounts are useful 
in depicting local variability in public audit oversight implementation. However, the broader issues 
of governmental transformation and the (re)building of governmental capacity and authority have 
largely remained unexplored. Also, the role of regulatory privatization as a governance process 
whose outcomes may themselves have consequences for the trajectory of governmental re-regula-
tion has not been explicitly addressed.
Studying Dynamics of Institutional Change in Audit Oversight
We see the interplay between regulatory privatization and public re-regulation not in terms of a 
lucid distinction between the public and the private, or regime replacement (from public to private 
and back), but as a ‘dance’ between public and private regulation where regulatory privatization is 
established and reworked by reference to the past and in collaboration with government organiza-
tions. We draw on the historical institutionalist literature (Conran & Thelen, 2016; Mahoney & 
Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) that sees changes in institutional arrangements as incre-
mental, subtle transformations occurring over time and engendered by the very properties of an 
institution subject to change. Following these studies, the institution of audit oversight can be 
defined as a ‘social regime’, i.e. ‘a set of rules stipulating expected behavior and “ruling out” 
behavior deemed to be undesirable … [which] involves rule makers and rule takers, the former 
setting and modifying, often in conflict and competition, the rules with which the latter are expected 
to comply’ (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, pp. 12–13). Institutions thus emerge not as self-reinforcing 
enduring outcomes of prior political battles but as ‘compromises or relatively durable though still 
contested settlements … [which are] always vulnerable to shifts’ (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009, p. 8). 
Institutional change and stability, thus, far from being separate analytical categories, represent ‘two 
sides of the same coin [in the sense that] the explanation of political change rests upon an analysis 
of the foundations of political stability’ (Conran & Thelen, 2016, p. 63). The chance of a triumph 
for the advocates of change is, to a great extent, contingent on the outcomes of the efforts of those 
who push for continuity.
Following Mahoney and Thelen (2009), what determines the particular type of incremental 
change that unfolds is a function of two factors, namely: (i) the character of the existing rules sup-
porting an institution, such as audit oversight (‘rule ambiguity’), and (ii) the prevailing political 
context and whether it affords the defenders of the status quo the power (‘veto possibilities’) to 
ensure continuity (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009, p. 7; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2009). Such a 
perspective focuses not only on the environmental conditions that invite particular change strate-
gies, but also on the very design of the institutional arrangements creating ‘openings for creativity 
and agency’ (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009, p. 12) and enabling actors to seek competing interpreta-
tions of one and the same rule in order to achieve favourable outcomes. A second factor shaping 
institutional change concerns the political context in which the change takes place and the ‘veto 
possibilities’ that public and private actors have to hinder or promote change. Such veto possibili-
ties, we argue, rest on the knowledge and expertise of actors as well as other resources, including 
administrative and legal resources.
Particular mixes of (strong/weak) ‘rule ambiguity’ and (strong/weak) ‘veto possibilities’ deter-
mine the type of institutional change that ensues (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 
2005). Displacement, i.e. the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones, occurs 
when agents have little discretion to mould existing institutional arrangements and opt to replace 
them in the face of little resistance from the defendants of the status quo. When veto possibilities 
are strong, displacement is unlikely and change occurs through layering when new rules, as a result 
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of amendments, revisions and subtle modifications, are attached to the existing ones to change the 
way in which the original rules structure behaviour (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009, p. 16). Drift and 
conversion occur when a targeted institution, such as audit oversight, affords actors significant 
interpretational freedom. Here, the rules themselves (e.g. audit oversight rules) remain untouched. 
They are either interpreted in new ways (conversion) or deliberately neglected (drift) in the face of 
changing environmental conditions and strong veto possibilities.
Mahoney and Thelen (2009, p. 22) acknowledged, but did not systematically problematize, the 
premise that ‘administrative capacities may be especially important’ for actors pursuing particular 
types of change, as their deficiencies or strengths here can create openings for the reinterpreting or 
amending of rules. Below, we extend Mahoney, Streeck and Thelen’s framework by placing greater 
attention on ‘law as resource’ (Pedriana & Stryker, 2004) (see also Edelman, Krieger, Eliason, 
Abiston, & Mellema, 2011; Edelman & Suchman, 1997) for shaping the capacity of state and non-
state actors with consequences for the resulting regulatory set-up. As Pedriana and Stryker (2004, 
p. 709) write, ‘capacity is a “moving target”, with state and societal actors building on legal as well 
as administrative resources to construct and transform capacity.’ In line with the above, we see 
regulatory capacity as comprising both administrative resources (money, trained personnel, bureau-
cratic infrastructure) and legal capacities (statutory construction, legal interpretation) that are nec-
essary for state and non-state actors to be able to deliver and/or co-ordinate the delivery of 
regulation. Here, legal capacities may relate to law-making (law on the books) but also an ability 
to mobilize law in pursuit of specific regulatory objectives (law in practice) (Bartley, 2011). 
Furthermore, law, first and foremost, should not be understood in terms of state-centred command 
and control but as an organizing device shaped by state and non-state actors. Law encompasses 
thus not only legislation but also legal-interpretive activity in a broader sense, including the draft-
ing of guidelines which interpret legislation involving state and non-state actors (Edelman & 
Suchman, 1997; Halliday & Carruthers, 2007; Pedriana & Stryker, 2004). We are particularly 
interested in how the role and capacity of the Russian government in the regulation of audit over-
sight was expanded through law over time, concurrent with regulatory privatization.
Methods and Data
We utilize a historical case study approach (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2008) to examine how 
regulatory change unfolds over time (Funk & Hirschman, 2014), including change in the prescrip-
tiveness of law, actors’ veto possibilities and ensuing public/private regulation dynamics. We draw on 
a rich body of empirical materials collected during several rounds of fieldwork between 2001 and 
2015 (Table 1). This includes documentary materials (government reports, professional associations’ 
documents, journal articles, press releases, audit market reports, legislative documents) to understand 
the changing (historical) context surrounding audit oversight. We also conducted 85 interviews (from 
30 to 180 minutes in length) with key stakeholders. Participant observations of audit professional 
gatherings and audit rule production (including the (re)drafting of the federal audit law over time) 
made it possible to situate the collected interviews and documents and study the evolving interactions 
between state and non-state actors in constructing audit oversight.
Most interviews were conducted during two periods of fieldwork. All interviews were conducted 
in Russian, except for eight interviews with representatives from the World Bank, foreign profes-
sional associations and international audit firms, which were conducted in English. During the first 
period (2001–2002), one of the authors conducted interviews with leading auditors, representatives 
of the Russian government, local and foreign professional accountancy bodies, World Bank officials 
and EU Tacis Project employees. The same author carried out participant observations in the 
International Centre for Accounting Reform, an internationally sponsored Moscow-based agency 
promoting development of Western-oriented accounting and audit. The author also participated in 
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an EU-funded Tacis Audit Reform project. This allowed access to key documentary evidence, such 
as the first country-wide database of Russian professional audit associations compiled in 2002, and 
a sequence of proposals for the landmark 2001 Federal Audit Law which introduced, for the first 
time, a formal framework for audit regulation, including audit oversight.
The second period of fieldwork (2003–2005), conducted by another author, focused on further 
data collection to trace the effects of the 2001 Audit Law. This included follow-up interviews with 
some of the individuals who had been interviewed during the first stage. The author participated in 
the Tacis project’s ‘Implementation of Audit Reform’ conference in Moscow (2005), which assem-
bled Russian audit firms, professional bodies, government officials as well as members of major 
European professional and regulatory organizations. The same author conducted a small number of 
Table 1. Sources of empirical materials.
Documents
Laws and regulations relating to audit oversight and their draft proposals
Reports, press releases and presentations by the Finance Ministry
State certification procedures for professional associations
Quality control procedures, disciplinary procedures, and other policies and documents by professional 
associations
Audit market reports and surveys
Professional conference proceedings
Professional and business press
Observations
International Centre for Accounting Reform (ICAR), Moscow (2001)
Tacis audit reform project, Moscow (2001–2002)
Tacis ‘Implementation of Auditing Reform in Russia’ conference, Moscow (2005)
Interviews
2001–2002: 48 interviews
Russian audit firms, 23
International audit firms, 8
Russian professional associations, 5
Finance Ministry, 2
Foreign professional associations, 2
EU Tacis Project, 4
World Bank, 2
Academic, 1
Professional journal editor, 1
2003–2005: 31 interviews
Russian audit firms, 19
International audit firms, 2
Russian professional associations, 3
Finance Ministry, 1
EU Tacis Project, 2
World Bank, 1
Academics, 3
2008–2013: 6 interviews
Russian professional associations, 3
Rosfinnadzor, 3
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further follow-up interviews with representatives from Russian professional associations and the 
government between 2008 and 2013 to collect views on amendments to the 2001 Audit Law which 
came into effect in 2008. Further, these interviews were corroborated with documentary evidence 
collected from online resources, professional and other media outlets, as well as government 
organizations.
All authors are proficient in English and Russian and were able to participate equally in the 
cross-examination of the empirical materials. In our analysis, we utilized an approach associated 
with examining qualitative process data from varied sources (Langley, 1999). We adopted a ‘tem-
poral bracketing strategy’ (Langley, 1999, p. 703) to trace dynamics of audit oversight privatization 
and re-regulation and examine how actions during one period led to changes in the context that 
affected actions in subsequent periods. We decomposed our material into two successive periods of 
audit oversight development (1993–2001 and 2001–2008). These periods were derived from an 
analysis of key events which identified the 2001 Audit Law and the revised 2008 Audit Law as the 
two key pieces of legislation governing the reorganization of audit oversight. Based on the provi-
sions in both laws, we identified two types of actors – (public) government organizations and 
(private) professional associations – as key constituents in audit oversight development. Audit 
firms officially did not enjoy any regulatory powers. Nevertheless, some firms were involved in the 
establishment of private oversight through membership in professional associations, and we traced 
their involvement where appropriate.
We tracked the prescriptiveness/ambiguity of different clauses in the laws over time, with a 
focus on the specified structure of professional associations, components of audit oversight, and 
the roles assigned to key players. We analysed documents and interviews to identify key events and 
activities preceding the issuance of the 2001 and 2008 laws, as well as accounts of interactions 
among government and professional actors and the way these shaped pathways of action in audit 
oversight (re)regulation. We also examined changing degrees to which the laws formally (re-)
defined the audit oversight arrangements and related responsibilities. We studied the capacities of 
key actors (government and professional bodies) to block change (i.e. their veto possibilities), as 
derived from formal regulatory remit as well as their (changing) capability to fulfil it in practice. 
The combination of different types of materials made it possible to compare, contrast and situate 
different representations of actors’ involvement in audit (re)regulation, thereby facilitating a multi-
layered understanding of how law was mobilized as a resource by state and non-state actors in the 
reorganization of audit oversight.
The Rise and Fall of Private Audit Oversight: Empirical Analysis
Privatizing audit oversight: From Temporary Rules to the 2001 Audit Law
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, between 1991 and 1993, the Russian government advanced 
private auditing as an institution for dealing with economic and social transition. The privatization 
of audit, first and foremost, was initiated by the Ministry of Finance and its financial control divi-
sion in an attempt to redefine its roles and relevance within an emerging market economy 
(Danilevsky, 1991, 1994). It was envisaged that conditions of market competition and the ensuing 
private [sobstvenny] and economic [khozraschetny] interests of commercial auditors would allow 
for quality and self-discipline in the conduct of market-oriented audits (Danilevsky, 1991). Yet, this 
does not mean that the government completely withdrew itself. The initial decision to privatize 
audit (and audit regulation) kicked off a longer process of institutional change, whereby the roles 
of the government in the market and, vice versa, the market in government were gradually rede-
fined, and relations between state and non-state actors reworked. As we show below, law played an 
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important mediating role here. Mobilized by both public and private actors, law became a resource 
for the setting and shifting of public/private boundaries and reorganizing of the audit regulatory 
space.
Auditing in Russia was largely unregulated. That changed in 1993 with the government’s 
endorsement of the Temporary Rules (Vremenniye Pravila) on Auditing which, for the first time, 
explicitly addressed the issue of audit oversight and the need for ‘effective certification and licens-
ing procedures’ for new entrants to the profession. These Rules were endorsed by Presidential 
Decree No. 2263 of 22 December 1993. In 1994, two governmental agencies – Central Certifying 
and Licensing Auditing Commissions (TsALAK) – were established by the government to oversee 
the issuing and withdrawal of audit firm licences and professional certificates for audit practition-
ers. One agency was attached to the Ministry of Finance and responsible for general audit licences. 
The other agency was accountable to the Central Bank and in charge of licences for the audits of 
banks. The new licensing agencies specified the amount of training hours and work experience 
needed for obtaining an audit licence, but not their content. These bodies, as well as the Temporary 
Rules, were also silent about the ongoing maintenance of audit quality. As one auditor commented 
on this period, ‘You received a certificate to practise, and no one really cared about what you were 
doing after that’ (Auditor in a Russian audit firm, 2004, Moscow). The auditing landscape was 
colourful and diverse. Next to the big international audit firms operated a small fraction of large 
indigenous firms, seeking to emulate their international counterparts. At the other end of the spec-
trum existed small audit firms and sole practitioners, often servicing only one or two clients. The 
Rules left it to the audit firms to define their work, and the controls thereof, by stating that ‘auditors 
and audit firms have the right to define methods and forms of audit controls themselves, provided 
that they are not in conflict with the laws of the Russian Federation’ (Temporary Rules on Auditing, 
1993, Art. 13). In so doing, the ambiguity of the Rules opened up a space for the emergent audit 
profession to organize itself and proactively define its tasks and jurisdiction.
The issuing of the Temporary Rules coincided with the creation of new, private professional 
associations: e.g., the Russian Collegium of Auditors (RCA) (1992); Moscow Audit Chamber 
(1992); Russian Audit Chamber (1995); Union of Professional Audit Organizations (SPAO) 
(1996); Institute of Professional Accountants (1997). The Rules encouraged the foundation of such 
associations by stating that ‘auditors and audit firms can, in accordance with the laws of the Russian 
Federation, form consortiums, associations and other forms of alliance to coordinate their activities 
or protect their professional interests’ (Temporary Rules on Auditing, 1993, Art. 8). Most associa-
tions accepted firms and individuals as members, and it was possible to hold memberships in more 
than one association.
Newly founded audit firms played a key role in the formation and running of the associations. 
SPAO, for example, was founded under the leadership of Unicon, which became one of Russia’s 
leading audit firms; and the RCA was founded by Alexander Ruf, director of Rufaudit. Associations 
were not regulated or accredited. Initially, they had no legally defined regulatory remit and served 
mainly as ‘socialization fora’ for Russian audit firms and auditors to articulate common approaches 
in their dealings with government, clients and other parties. The associations shared similar objec-
tives: to contribute to the development of the auditing profession, to represent member interests 
and to provide training.1 Entry barriers were not high. Anyone interested (firms or individuals) 
could join, and no association at that time had formalized systems of disciplinary procedures 
applied to their members. Furthermore, membership was not compulsory. Hence, many auditors 
and audit firms remained professionally ‘unorganized’ and ‘unsupervised’. With time, however, 
one could see signs, at least in some associations, of growing dissatisfaction with the status quo and 
calls for the widening of their regulatory remit, also with regard to overseeing the quality of their 
members’ work, which often was seen to be low:
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Representing member interests has always been a relevant function, and our association has been doing 
that, but then we also understood it was not enough, that there was a need for an effective system of quality 
control [audit oversight] that should be formally delegated to the professional associations. (President of 
Professional Association A, Moscow, 2001)
The vagueness of the Temporary Rules in defining and locating audit oversight opened up pos-
sibilities for the associations to pursue state-independent attempts to establish in-house (private) 
audit oversight arrangements in the form of peer reviews. Peer reviews had long been among the 
core activities of professional associations elsewhere (United Kingdom, the US, France, Germany). 
In Russia, the Institute of Professional Auditors in Russia (IPAR), formerly SPAO, was among the 
first associations to introduce a programme where quality controllers from member firms (peers) 
came to check the work performed by other member firms. The President of IPAR, Daria 
Dolotenkova, emphasized the procedural rigour of her association’s approach:
IPAR’s Quality Committee has developed a detailed framework for the IPAR quality control [audit 
oversight] system that comprises the following guidelines: (1) the Concept of Assessing the Quality of 
Audits Undertaken by IPAR’s Member Firms/Auditors, (2) Quality Control Policies for Audits Undertaken 
by IPAR’s Member Firms and Individual Auditors, (3) the Regulation ‘On the Principles of Selecting 
IPAR’s Quality Controllers’, (4) the technical guidance ‘On Reviewing the Quality of Auditor’s Reports’, 
and others. (Dolotenkova, 2001)
IPAR quality controllers reviewed audit files, internal audit manuals and other documentation 
relating to specific audit engagements to ascertain compliance with internationally oriented audit-
ing standards, ethical principles and state licensing requirements. The controllers were selected 
from certified auditors of member firms with prior quality control experience. Those applying to 
become a quality controller needed to undertake training and obtain a certificate from the associa-
tion to conduct reviews. Yet, unlike their prototypes in the West, the peer reviews were not so much 
used to control, oversee and, where appropriate, discipline members. Participation in them was 
voluntary and largely inconsequential. Rather, they were offered by the association as a service to 
their members, so that they could mutually learn from each other and enhance their expertise, if 
wanted. Particularly large Russian firms were key promoters:
Large audit firms that are members of the association simply decided to impose upon themselves oversight 
measures. It was their voluntary decision. They helped the associations like ours to define and carry out 
quality control based on their firms’ internal practices, they also travelled around the country to teach others. 
(Presentation, Daria Dolotenkova, ‘Implementation of Auditing Reform’ Conference, Moscow, 2005)
Ties with foreign counterparts played an important role in enabling the development of expertise 
to conduct peer reviews. A president of another professional association emphasized cooperation 
with the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes, a French professional accountancy 
body, in establishing their peer review scheme.
As noted, the peer reviews were not so much a mechanism that allowed professional associa-
tions to systematically enhance oversight across the board. But they were instrumental for the crea-
tion of pockets of expertise; and they could be used by the associations to set themselves and their 
members apart from the ‘audit riffraff’, including quack auditors. Furthermore, the peer reviews 
allowed professional associations to demonstrate self-regulatory capacity vis-a-vis the government 
which, at that time, lacked resources, particularly expertise and an administrative apparatus, to 
implement effective audit oversight arrangements. Comments below show that this view was 
shared not only by the associations and their members but also within government circles:
Alon et al. 11
The Finance Ministry has not the personnel [to run audit inspections]. You need a lot of people to check 
the 40,500 licence holders that we currently have […]! They [the Ministry] don’t have the proper 
methodology [for audit oversight] either. (President of Professional Association D, Moscow, 2001)
It is clear that the government needs relevant resources and expertise to do this [audit inspections] to be 
the regulator, the thought leader, to show direction. […] Realistically, the Finance Ministry alone cannot 
achieve this. (Deputy Director of a large Russian audit firm, Moscow, 2001)
There are important roles to play for self-regulatory professional associations, one is the authority to 
oversee [audit] quality. (Official from the Finance Ministry’s Research Institute, Moscow, 2001)
Whereas the Temporary Rules did not contain any specific audit oversight provisions, this was 
changed with the adoption of the Federal Audit Law which replaced the Temporary Rules in August 
2001. Work on the law had already begun in the 1990s with significant input from international 
organizations, including the World Bank and European Commission (via their Tacis Audit Reform 
project whose primary beneficiary was the Ministry of Finance). Alongside these organizations, 
national professional associations were actively involved in the drafting and debating of the law. 
Their claim to authority as knowledgeable experts and legitimate representatives of the audit pro-
fession were evident at a working group meeting in February 2001, set up to debate the draft law. 
Here, one of the authors observed how the opening speech of the TsALAK official from the 
Ministry of Finance was quickly aborted by a representative from one association with: ‘Bureaucrats 
will speak later, first the professionals.’ The interview excerpt below provides additional insight 
into the power dynamic surrounding the debate:
The Government and Duma do not have many audit experts; they are not equipped to make judgements as 
to which [audit] law draft is better, what will work and what won’t work. So, the professional associations 
then have to tell them, ‘Do this, and don’t do that’! (Head of International Audit in a large Russian audit 
firm, Moscow, 2001)
The professional associations and their [firm] members gained political support for private peer 
reviews from international counterparts (Samsonova, 2009). In particular, the European partners in 
the EU-funded Tacis Audit Reform project pointed to the lack of widely accepted peer review 
mechanisms as a threat to public confidence in Russian auditing.2 Similar views were also voiced 
in our interviews by members of international audit firms in Russia who expressed preference for 
self-regulation.
The first Federal Law on Auditing was signed by President Putin in August 2001. The Law 
formally delegated to professional associations a range of regulatory duties, including the respon-
sibility for monitoring the quality of audit work. Article 20 of the Law stated that professional 
associations:
[…] perform independently, or as delegated by the federal agency, quality control for their members, [and] 
take disciplinary actions.
Through the provisions of the Law, the government effectively granted a formal status to the 
private voluntary audit oversight arrangements. While formally recognizing the primary role of the 
associations in enacting such arrangements, the Law, however, also contained the following Article:
The system of external oversight over auditors and audit firms is established by the authorized federal 
agency which can perform the quality inspections independently but can also delegate such inspections to 
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accredited professional associations which can implement the process for their members. (Federal Law on 
Auditing, 2001, Art. 14)
A reference to ‘accredited professional associations’ indicates that, while extending the associa-
tions’ regulatory remit, the system of regulation was not fully ‘privatized’. The government retained 
a form of residual control through provisions introducing a government-administered accreditation 
of the associations. Further, a reference to the ‘authorized federal agency’ effectively provided a 
‘back door’ for government actors to re-emerge as a dominant force and, if necessary, impose an 
additional layer of state-administered oversight at any point in the future. It has to be noted, how-
ever, that the Law itself did not contain any explicit detail about the nature of such oversight 
arrangements, nor did it specify through what organizational infrastructure these would be enabled. 
But the Law opened up possibilities for more legislative detail in the future, for example through 
Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Resolutions.
In sum, the early post-Soviet government lacked both knowledge and administrative capacities 
to either define or execute audit oversight. These limits of the government with regard to both rule 
development and enactment coupled with significant interpretational freedoms arising from the 
vague nature of the Temporary Rules enabled professional associations to engage in rule conver-
sion (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) and mobilize the law (in our case 
Temporary Rules) as a resource in pursuit of their own interests. Paraphrasing Streeck and Thelen 
(2005, p. 26), we could say that the Temporary Rules were reinterpreted to ‘fit the interests of new 
actors’, in our case the newly formed professional associations and their goals of organizational 
self-preservation and regulatory expansion. The 2001 Federal Audit Law can be seen as formally 
entrenching this new status quo. The above demonstrates new veto possibilities acquired by the 
profession (professional associations and their [firm] members) vis-a-vis government actors, as 
part of wider processes of post-Soviet market-oriented transformation. Yet, at the same time, the 
Law also provided government actors (in our case the Finance Ministry) with new possibilities for 
intervention and expansion (e.g. in providing for the creation of an ‘authorized federal agency’ to 
oversee the profession’s activities). In other words, the Law enabled elements of public surveil-
lance to be ‘layered’ (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009) onto the evolving private forms of audit oversight 
as a means to ensure that, although delegated to private actors, the enactment of audit oversight 
could be ultimately controlled and, if necessary, revisited by the government.
Re-regulating audit oversight: Towards the 2008 Audit Law
The 2001 Law had laid the foundation for the formal institutionalization of self-regulation. It had 
also set parameters for further professional consolidation by stipulating that professional associa-
tions should not have fewer than 1,000 certified auditors and/or 100 licensed audit firms, thereby 
withdrawing the breeding ground for small associations. At some point there were more than 100 
associations.3 Details of the accreditation process were set out in guidance prepared by the Ministry 
of Finance in cooperation with the associations (particularly, IPAR and RCA)4 demanding that any 
accredited association followed generally accepted auditing standards, a code of ethics, and proce-
dures for audit quality control (e.g. through peer review). As the president of a professional asso-
ciation stated:
The Law put quality control on the agenda. […] We first started with quality controllers, with the decision 
on who can be a quality controller. We developed a set of requirements for these people. We then realized 
that we needed to certify them. So, we conducted controller certification in all major cities where we had 
our branches. This generated 150 controllers. We developed review programmes and had them approved 
by our Executive Team. (President of Professional Association C, Moscow, 2005)
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Daria Dolotenkova, IPAR’s President, argued at the ‘Implementation of Auditing Reform’ confer-
ence in Moscow in 2005:
Audit oversight [via peer reviews] was created by the associations [in Russia]. Without us, there would be 
no quality control [oversight].
Peer reviews had advanced to become an accepted mechanism of self-regulation, as the Law 
required all accredited associations to adopt audit quality control programmes that, among other 
things, could be based on peer reviews. By 2006, all six newly accredited associations had intro-
duced in-house peer review systems. By that time, after years spent effectively on the sidelines of 
Russia’s audit regulatory scene, the Big Four international audit firms became more active. In 
2004, both KPMG and PwC announced simultaneously their membership in the Russian Audit 
Chamber.5 In addition, KPMG also joined IPAR. Until the adoption of the 2001 Law, the Big Four 
had not visibly participated in audit regulation debates. Yet, with the official recognition of profes-
sional associations as self-regulatory organizations this changed. The firms did not want to be left 
behind in the process of professional consolidation and sought to strengthen their and the associa-
tions’ positioning vis-a-vis government actors:
A certain catalyst for this process was the bill providing for amendments to the [2001] Audit Law. We 
understood that if we did not convey our united view to the Ministry of Finance and the Duma, we could 
be kicked out of here, from this country. (Big 4 Partner and representative in a professional association, 
Moscow, 2008)
However, despite these developments, peer reviews did not come to work as a systematic, 
nationwide mechanism of professional control. In 2006, only 20 percent of Russian audit firms 
were reported to have undergone peer reviews, which could be seen as a direct result of the fact that 
under the Law professional membership remained voluntary (for both audit firms and auditors), 
and only member firms were subject to the reviews (Bikbaeva, 2006). Privately organized over-
sight was thus still patchy and fragmented. Besides, a survey of Russian auditors conducted by the 
Tacis project in 2006 revealed a common perception that peer reviews were concerned mainly with 
maintaining an appearance of conformity, also noting strong competition among associations over 
members and their poor public accountability (Tacis Audit Reform, 2007). Similar views were 
expressed by the European Commission in a report on Russian audit development (European 
Commission, 2006), which highlighted that many associations lacked authority with their mem-
bers to conduct effective peer reviews. This is not surprising given the competitive environment 
surrounding the associations where attraction of members in terms of quantity (rather than quality) 
was what the Law had primarily stipulated.
In parallel, the Ministry of Finance had begun to reorganize itself. Following the Law, in 2002, 
the Ministry had signed statutes [polozhenie] to establish an Audit Council under its direction. The 
Council brought together representatives from government, professional associations, audit practi-
tioners and academics to:
gauge opinions from professional audit market participants in relation to questions concerning the 
formation and realization of government policies in auditing. (Ministry of Finance Resolution [prikaz] N 
47H of 3 June 2002)
The Council was an organizational device that brought government actors closer to the profes-
sion, and vice versa. It exposed government officials to professional audit expertise and could be 
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used as a platform to jointly work out audit oversight regulation. Also, within the Ministry of 
Finance new personnel with practical audit experience were hired. In 2004, Leonid Shneidman 
became the new Head of the Finance Ministry’s Department responsible for audit regulation. Prior 
to that he had spent twelve years with the Russian branch of PwC, where he had progressed from 
senior manager to partner. These changes enabled the state to build in-house administrative capac-
ity close to, and drawn from, the audit market.
Shneidman introduced additional layers of (government) oversight over the profession, mobi-
lizing and further specifying the Law (particularly Article 18 setting out functions of the above-
mentioned ‘authorized federal agency’). Under Shneidman’s leadership, resolutions regarding the 
governmental accreditation process and control of professional associations were issued (see 
Ministry of Finance Resolution [prikaz] N74H of 17 June 2005). Following these, the Ministry 
began to audit the peer review schemes of the associations. In 2006, the Ministry identified seven 
problem areas, including a lack of transparency in the selection of participants and reporting of 
review outcomes, and varying levels of expertise of peer reviewers (Ministry of Finance, 2007). A 
year later, it reported no improvement in the problem areas, while also noting competition among 
associations as one of the reasons for their unwillingness to apply a more rigorous peer review 
approach (Ministry of Finance, 2008).
Thus, over time, the government had become more sceptical about the associations’ capacity to 
self-regulate. Publicly showing up the weaknesses of the profession, the Ministry of Finance repo-
sitioned itself as a vigorous regulatory actor. This coincided with a major overhaul of the 2001 
Audit Law, which reconfigured relations between government actors and the professional associa-
tions. In contrast to the drafting of the 2001 Audit Law, this time, the professional associations had 
a significantly diminished role in the development of the Law. As noted by the president of one 
association:
The [new] version of the law under consideration was not discussed and not published on the MinFin’s 
[Ministry of Finance’s] site. We had to use unofficial sources [to exercise influence], which I consider 
wrong. There should have been a public discussion, at least with the professional associations. (President 
of Professional Association D, Moscow, 2008)
The amended Audit Law (Federal Law on Auditing, 2008), signed by Putin in December 2008, 
provided the legal basis for revising private audit oversight as a preferred mode of audit firm gov-
ernance. First, the new Law, for the first time, specified the scope and objectives of peer reviews. 
It made professional membership mandatory for all practising auditors and audit firms and stipu-
lated that all member firms are peer-reviewed every three years. The Law specified further that the 
federal agency should oversee the audits of public interest entities (listed or large companies, 
banks, insurance providers, pension funds), alongside the professional associations. Second, the 
Law contained provisions which required the professional associations themselves to be subject to 
regular (biennial) control reviews by the Ministry of Finance. It charged the federal agency with 
the task of maintaining a register of professional associations and their members. Third, the Law 
set out new membership thresholds for the professional associations (at least 700 certified auditors 
or 500 licensed audit firms).
Rationalizing the need for the overhaul, Finance Ministry officials stressed not only the capacity 
deficits of the self-regulating professional associations. They also appealed to the post-Enron reali-
ties in European countries as a legitimate reason for questioning the role of private actors (associa-
tions) in the conduct of audit oversight. The collapse of US energy giant Enron and the demise of 
its auditor Arthur Andersen in 2002 had led to a global rise of public audit oversight.6 Andrey 
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Krikunov, former Head of the Finance Ministry’s Department responsible for audit regulation, 
wrote in this respect:
In our work, we should not lose sight of international developments. […] We have seen a series of 
transformative changes in matters relating to audit oversight taking place internationally and in regions, 
such as Europe, over the past four years. The global audit profession effectively has come to realize that 
audit oversight should be administered by the profession [professional associations, added] as well as 
organizations with public interest remit. (Krikunov, 2007, p. 85)
Government officials in charge of audit regulation emphasized that any oversight arrangement 
should be in the interest of the public. They saw state actors, rather than private actors, as legiti-
mate guardians of the public interest:
External audit oversight is better handled by the authorities because their role is to guarantee overall 
functioning of capital markets and the economy. If you look at the activities of the state in matters of audit 
oversight, they clearly lie within the public interest remit. (Leonid Shneidman, Krikunov’s successor)7
The international developments presented the Russian government with an opportunity to legiti-
mately reaffirm its sovereignty in matters of audit regulation. This was also in line with President 
Putin’s ongoing efforts to cultivate an image of the Russian government as assertive and a power 
to be reckoned with, also abroad. A rhetoric of ‘state revival’ was a common feature of the public 
discourse and assessments of the Russian political sphere at the time.8
Prior to adopting the new Law, the Finance Ministry had at least initially been eager to soften 
the perceived impact of the changes on the associations by emphasizing ‘a significant extension of 
the role of associations in matters of audit quality’ (Shneidman, 2005). Subsequently, however, the 
Finance Ministry came to adopt a progressively tougher approach in its dealings with the associa-
tions. This continued after the 2008 Law had been enacted. Assessing the results of peer reviews 
conducted in 2009, the Ministry noted that, despite ongoing concerns over audit quality, only 3 out 
of 611 firms reviewed had been cautioned by their association (Ministry of Finance, 2010). In 
2010, the government passed additional amendments to the 2008 Audit Law that entrusted a new 
ministerial agency, Rosfinnadzor [Russian Financial Oversight], operating under the Finance 
Ministry, with the task to conduct audit inspections of public interest entities. In many respects, the 
agency’s responsibilities paralleled the oversight function performed by the associations and 
included a remit to singlehandedly revoke audit licences, thus, bypassing the associations.
In summary, the worldwide public re-regulation of audit oversight in the post-Enron era enabled 
the government to call into question the self-regulatory remits of the national professional associa-
tions. Growing (governmental) evidence of the low effectiveness of peer reviews had tarnished the 
associations’ image as ‘experts’ of audit oversight, thereby diminishing their ‘veto possibilities’ 
with regard to interpreting, enacting and further developing the Audit Law (Mahoney & Thelen, 
2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The associations’ weakening veto possibilities were in juxtaposi-
tion to a growing image of the Finance Ministry as a more astute regulatory actor, laying the 
groundwork for a shift from passive to more assertive government policy.
The 2008 Audit Law and subsequent 2010 amendments provided the government with a means 
for oversight re-regulation, granting government actors – the Finance Ministry and Rosfinnadzor 
– a more defined and expansive role in overseeing the work of the associations as well as directly 
executing some of their oversight duties (e.g. with respect to inspections of public interest audits). 
Through the revised Law, government actors were now in a position to define not only what is a 
professional association but also what constitutes effective audit oversight. In this emerging 
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layered infrastructure of oversight, they had reinserted themselves as a key player. The Finance 
Ministry had developed additional layers of oversight (accreditation, peer review inspection) that 
challenged the self-regulatory capacity of private associations. Prior literature has highlighted that 
amendments to rules initially supporting an institution may eventually come to challenge its very 
existence as new practices resulting from the amendments gain prominence (Streeck & Thelen, 
2005, p. 24). In our case, such challenge has not led to a displacement, but to a governmental 
reframing of private audit regulation. On the one hand, self-regulating professional associations 
came to be more firmly embedded in Russia’s audit oversight architecture.9 On the other hand, the 
Finance Ministry emerged as key orchestrator of the new public-private governance arrangements. 
Earlier privatization of audit regulation contributed to the subsequent strengthening of public 
authority not only in providing government organizations with a target of criticism against which 
they could re-legitimize governmental intervention. Privatization was also a resource that enabled 
the Finance Ministry to tap into market-oriented audit and regulation expertise (through the profes-
sional associations) while specifying and expanding its own remit.
Discussion and Conclusion
We trace a long-term process of institutional change to get to grips with dynamics of change in the 
composition and relative influence and capacity of public and private actors over time, focusing on 
the case of audit oversight re-regulation in post-Soviet Russia. We show how regulatory privatiza-
tion can work as a means through which government actors (in our case the Russian Finance 
Ministry) can maintain or enhance their relevance and authority. We highlight the particular role of 
‘legislative layering’ in this process. We define legislative layering as a process in which govern-
ment actors, through laws and other forms of legislative provisions and guidance, introduce layers 
of regulation that build on and expand existing regulatory structures. Attention to legislative layer-
ing does not only help explore dynamics of change observed in the case of audit oversight reor-
ganization in Russia. It is also of broader relevance, as it helps us rethink the relationship between 
organization, law and public-private regulation more generally.
First, it underscores that we should not treat law simply as an instrument of regulation, namely 
command and control, that sits next to, or interacts with, other regulatory instruments, such as 
private voluntary standards. Law can also function as an organizational resource, as a tool to reor-
ganize ‘regulatory space’ (Hancher & Moran, 1989) and (re)build regulatory capacity (see here 
also Pedriana & Stryker, 2004; Lodge & Wegrich, 2014). Of course, law does not do that by itself. 
It shapes, and is shaped by, the actors mobilizing it – public and private. Second, the notion of 
legislative layering highlights the role of ‘the indeterminacy of the law’ (rule ambiguity) (Edelman, 
1992; Halliday & Carruthers, 2007) in moulding public-private governance relations, and pro-
cesses of regulatory capacity-building, respectively. It stresses the importance of attending to dif-
ferent types and levels of indeterminacy in law-making (law on the books) and law enactment (law 
in practice) (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Bartley, 2011; Halliday & Carruthers, 2007). We need to be 
attentive to the influence of the form of law itself, and the dynamics and tensions unfolding between 
law-making and law enactment. Third, our study shows the relevance of both exogenous and 
endogenous factors, national and transnational processes and actors, in facilitating legislative lay-
ering and the building of regulatory capacity. In doing so, we also draw attention to the co-consti-
tuted nature of public-private regulation. We highlight that in public-private governance, state and 
non-state actors moderate and extend each other’s organizing influence and capacity to act.
Building on and extending Mahoney, Streeck and Thelen’s historical institutional framework 
(Conran & Thelen, 2016; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2009), we 
suggest that the manner in which government actors employ legislative layering as a resource, and 
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the regulatory outcomes that ensue, are determined by the institutional properties of the regulatory 
regime itself (regulatory ambiguity/prescriptiveness), actors’ veto possibilities in law-making and 
law enactment, as well as exogenous factors, transnational events, actors and processes. We see the 
links between regulatory capacity, legislative layering and the historical institutionalist framework 
as two-fold.
First, capacity considerations shape the properties (ambiguity/prescriptiveness) of law, as law 
provisions are developed with a view of what can be enacted in principle. In our case, the 2001 
Audit Law contained reference to, but not an explicit delineation of, the role of the government in 
the operation of audit oversight, which may be seen as a consequence of the Finance Ministry’s 
lacking resources (personnel, administrative and expertise) at the time. Here, maintaining ambigu-
ity in what Abbott and Snidal (2000) termed ‘law on the books’ may be seen as a strategy that state 
actors employ to manage capacity-related deficiencies that would become apparent in ‘law in 
practice’.
Second, regulatory capacity, comprising both administrative resources (money, trained person-
nel, bureaucratic infrastructure) and legal capacity (statutory construction, legal interpretation) 
conditions the veto possibilities of public and private actors to secure continuity of regulatory 
arrangements. In public-private governance regimes, the mutually contingent nature of such veto 
possibilities is a feature of an often-dispersed regulatory set-up in which capacities required to 
maintain a given governance regime are shared between state and non-state actors.
As our case reveals, government actors’ veto possibilities are rarely secured purely on the basis 
of their legislative remit (the authority to develop law); they are also dependent on their problem-
solving capacities, ability to enact law, and image as authoritative decision-maker. Government 
actors that depend on private actors for the delivery of public outcomes (such as audit quality) may 
seek to strengthen their political authority by developing coordination capacities that enable con-
trol, or that provide scope for future discretionary action to contain private actors or reassert public 
authority. Here, strategies of hands-on involvement give way to more layered, arms-length forms 
of influence to ensure that private governance retains accountability to government (see also 
Arellano-Gault et al., 2013). At the same time, such processes need not be one way; whether and 
how government actors will be able to exercise their veto possibilities and shape legislative layer-
ing in the future is dependent on the ongoing interactions between state and non-state actors, as 
well as developments in the transnational regulatory field (Djelic & Sahlin, 2009, 2012).
Table 2 shows how initially the ambiguity of the law (of the Temporary Rules and 2001 Audit 
Law) provided the professional associations with organizational and interpretational freedoms that 
allowed them to mobilize (convert) law in pursuit of their own, self-preserving interests (see Phase 
1). The Finance Ministry maintained legislative provisions sufficiently vague to encourage the 
building of oversight capacity by the private actors themselves (professional associations and their 
members). For the associations, the experience and knowledge of member firms as well as exchange 
relationships with European counterparts played a major role in boosting their veto possibilities 
vis-a-vis government actors. The Big Four firms were motivated to join the associations and share 
their audit quality review expertise, thereby enhancing the associations’ capacity and reputation. 
All this helped the associations to represent themselves as effective administrators of audit over-
sight and a central hub for audit development.
Phase 2, on the other hand, saw a progressive strengthening of the capacities and standing of 
government actors. The Finance Ministry re-established itself as a key audit regulatory authority. 
Progressive legislative layering, through the issuing of more detailed legal provisions (e.g. with 
regard to professional accreditation requirements), locked in more government-oriented regulatory 
strategies. The 2008 Law and subsequent statutory work, which established Rosfinnadzor as a 
recognized public regulatory actor, transformed the Finance Ministry into an operator of audit 
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oversight alongside the associations. The Ministry engaged in a process of reorganization which 
involved, among other things, the inclusion of senior private sector auditors in its ranks to develop 
stronger in-house regulatory capacity. Furthermore, it was able to mobilize external resources in 
support of its changed regulatory strategy. A series of international events, spearheaded by the col-
lapse of Enron, provided the Ministry with a legitimate blueprint against which it could rationalize 
and defend the shift from regulatory privatization toward oversight re-regulation vis-a-vis the 
profession.
Reflecting on the implications of these observations for our broader understanding of 
dynamics of incremental institutional change (Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2009), it is 
noteworthy that legislative layering and rule conversion remained key change mechanisms in 
both phases, yet they produced very different regulatory outcomes – oversight privatization in 
Phase 1 and re-regulation in Phase 2 (Table 2). The historical institutionalist framework puts 
much emphasis on ‘veto players’, next to ‘rule ambiguity’, as key drivers of change (or stabil-
ity). Our study highlights the need to problematize, and further specify, the resources that 
afford such veto players their power (‘veto possibilities’). In the case studied here, important 
stimuli for institutional change came not only from within but also from without (the EU Tacis 
Table 2. Gradual change of audit oversight regime.
Phase 1: Phase 2:
Period Early 1990s to early 2000s Early to late 2000s
Key laws at start/end 
of period
1993 Temporary Rules/2001 Audit Law 2001 Audit Law/2008 Audit Law
Provisions of laws at 
the start/end of period
Vague – audit oversight discussed but 
government has no means to achieve it
More prescriptive – both private and 
public elements of oversight are 
defined – in more detail
More prescriptive (see end of 
Phase 1)
Enhanced prescriptiveness – 
additional provisions that further 
delineate and strengthen public 
oversight
Discretion in law 
interpretation
High first but then decreasing Decreasing
Veto possibilities Mutually contingent but progressively 
stronger for associations
Mutually contingent but 
progressively stronger for state 
actors
State position vis-a-vis 
oversight privatization
Defender Challenger
Regulatory capacity State – utilizes capacity of private 
actors to strengthen its own capacity 
through law-making
Associations – interpret law as resource 
for building capacity to administer peer 
reviews
State – builds on and expands 
capacity through further law-
making
Associations – self-regulatory 
remit is challenged by evidence 
of their insufficient capacity to 
deliver peer reviews
Mechanisms of change
Exogenous influences
State – legislative layering
Associations – conversion
Strong advocacy of peer reviews 
by international audit firms and 
organizations (i.e. EU)
State – further legislative layering 
Associations – conversion
Global rise of public audit 
oversight following the collapse 
of Enron
Resulting regulatory 
outcome
Oversight privatization Oversight re-regulation
Alon et al. 19
Programme, international audit firms, transnational audit scandals and resultant external leg-
islative reforms, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). These exogenous influences mediate (local) 
institutional change, the authority of governance actors and the legitimacy of their activities 
(Djelic & Sahlin, 2009, 2012). Such exogenous influences need to be conceptualized as impor-
tant co-determinants of institutional change, as they shape actor constellations and their 
respective veto possibilities, as well as the form that mechanisms of legislative layering and 
conversion take.
Further, we would like to point out that in our case neither government nor private actors were 
in a position to unequivocally dominate institutional change agendas. Although the government 
and the associations played different roles in the development and enactment of audit oversight 
rules in the respective phases studied here, neither could exercise exclusive control over the over-
sight regime. Instead, their veto possibilities were mutually contingent and reciprocally condi-
tioned. Laws were mutually reinterpreted and layered rather than ‘displaced’. This points to the 
need to adopt a dynamic, relational approach when studying interactions between state and non-
state actors in public-private governance regimes. Relations between state and non-state actors 
co-evolve over time; each acts as a (flexible) surround for the other (Abbott, 2005). In our case, 
regulatory privatization provided a fruitful ground for a subsequent strengthening of state actors. 
By readjusting its regulatory remit (first, as a proponent and then as a challenger of oversight pri-
vatization – see Table 2) the Finance Ministry was able to maintain continuity of regulatory provi-
sions for audit quality enhancement. Change (through legislative layering) was a key means for it 
to preserve its influence, albeit in altered form.
To conclude, far from being a triumph of markets or a de facto displacement of the state, pro-
cesses of regulatory privatization appear greatly reliant on public authority to be operational. 
Through legislative layering, state actors can shape the very possibilities of what may be achieved 
by private regulation, and the particular forms and modes in which it develops. Our study high-
lights the need to appreciate the multifaceted ways in which market-oriented neo-liberal govern-
ance is conditioned by public authority. This contributes not only to a better understanding of the 
vulnerabilities and limits of private/market governance, but also to the possible sources of the 
claimed revival of the government as a dominant regulatory actor.
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Notes
1. Tacis project documentation, accessed during fieldwork in 2002.
2. Tacis project documentation, accessed during fieldwork in 2002.
3. Tacis project documentation, accessed during fieldwork in 2002.
4. See ‘Temporary recommendations for the conduct of accreditations of professional associations under 
the Ministry of Finance’ of 17 June 2005, No. 74 (translated from Russian).
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5. See ‘The Big Four recognized Russia: PwC and KPMG joined the Russian professional audit associa-
tions’, Kommersant, 02.04.2004 (translated from Russian). Retrieved from https://www.kommersant.ru 
/doc/462965 on 15 July 2017.
6. In 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy after being accused of financial reporting fraud. Subsequently, this 
led to the demise of its auditor, Arthur Andersen, and gave rise to the emergence of independent national 
audit oversight agencies taking on the self-regulatory responsibilities previously performed by profes-
sional associations.
7. See ‘Interview with Leonid Shneidman: Majority of Russian auditors operate in an old-fashioned way’, 
Kommersant Money, 07.04.2008 (translated from Russian). Retrieved from http://www.kommersant.ru 
/doc/876197 on 15 October 2017.
8. See ‘The era of Putin’, Expert, 02.11.2007 (translated from Russian). Retrieved from http://expert.ru 
/russian_reporter/2007/19/epoha_putina/ on 13 June 2018.
9. See also the Federal Law ‘On self-regulating organizations’ no. 315-FZ of 1 December 2007.
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